Submitted to the Sub-theme 13: Global Sourcing and the Reorganization of
Firms, Industries and Employment (Convenors: Lewin / Manning / Massini) at the






Towards a multi-organizational practice perspective on implementation: Labor 




Kadire Zeynep Sayım*, Michael Fichter**, Markus Helfen***, Jörg Sydow*** 
 
* Bilkent University, Faculty of Business Administration, 06800, Ankara, Turkey 
kzeynep@bilkent.edu.tr 
 




*** Department of Management, Free University of Berlin, Boltzmannstr. 20, 14195, 
Berlin, Germany 
markus.helfen@fu-berlin.de ; joerg.sydow@fu-berlin.de 
 
 
Submitted to the Sub-theme 13: Global Sourcing and the Reorganization of Firms, 










International Framework Agreements (IFAs) are still a unique approach to regulating global 
labor relations, but they are increasingly drawing the attention of academics and practitioners. 
In contrast to usually unilateral and voluntary character of corporate social responsibility 
(CSR), IFAs are based upon a bilateral agreement between transnational corporations (TNCs) 
and global union federations (GUFs). As implied by the term "framework", IFAs are intended 
to provide a delineated space for the improvement of labor conditions and labor relations 
throughout the operations of a TNC and its “global production network” (GPN) (Coe et al. 
2008). In fact, a very significant aspect of IFAs lies in their coverage of GPNs of TNCs, 
including their subsidiaries and suppliers, which are shifting more to less-developed 
economies. As such, although the IFAs have two signatories, there are more groups of actors 
involved in the negotiation and particularly implementation process. Lastly, the coverage of 
these “bilateral” agreements, which in practice are multi-organizational, has been gradually 
increasing particularly since 2000. Over a decade after the first IFA had been signed, only 
eight IFAs had been negotiated between the management of TNCs and GUFs in 2000 (Gallin 
2008), while ten years later there are now around 80.  
Drawing on our assessment of the key issues, problems and challenges in the IFA 
process as a whole, it is our intention in this paper to construct a typology of the IFA 
implementation process resulting in an IFA Implementation Scale (IS). Our starting point is a 
multi-organizational practice perspective. In essence, we conceive the implementation of 
such an agreement in practice as both a means and an outcome of the interaction of many 
organizations acting “on behalf” of capital and labor; an interaction that is contested and takes 
place in an institutionally complex and potentially diverse environment that structures and is 
structured by this interaction (Giddens 1984). Using data collected from various parties 
involved in the negotiation and implementation process of an IFA, we aim to differentiate 
between distinct types of implementation in TNCs and their GPNs, including their 
subsidiaries and suppliers in various countries, resulting in a range of typologies. We further 
intend to develop an IFA-Implementation Scale (IS) using the three core practices we identify 
for a “full scale” implementation. While it is not always possible to find fully implemented 
IFAs throughout the GPN of TNCs, we aim to develop an analytical tool that will help 
understand different levels of implementation on the “full-scale” and non-implementation 





A Multi-organizational Practice Perspective on IFA Implementation 
While an IFA is by definition an agreement signed by one (or more) GUFs and the 
management of a TNC, a closer look at the signatures on the agreement points to the 
involvement of other organizations on the labor side. Our analysis of the negotiation process 
(Fichter et al. 2011) and the work of others (e.g. Hammer 2005; Papadakis 2011) shows that 
the national unions in the home country of the TNC and (European) works councils are 
frequently important actors on the “labor” side. On the “capital” side, central management 
typically reserves the exclusive right to negotiate on behalf of the TNC, although its policies 
are sometimes based on information exchange with a national employers‟ organization in 
consultation with the International Organization of Employers (IOE).  
With the commencement of the implementation phase, the potential number of 
organizational actors involved is significantly increased. Beyond the signatory organizations, 
which remain involved via implementation and monitoring provisions, national and local 
representatives of capital and labor are directly charged with putting the agreement into 
practice. It is true that the implementation of the IFA is first and foremost the responsibility of 
the TNC, a commitment made by central management in signing the agreement.  
While the thrust of management policy is a crucial and possibly the decisive 
determinant, our analysis of implementation would be too narrow if we were to restrict it to 
"management", which is itself characterized by diversity and interest politics. Besides the 
potential multiplicity of organizational actors in the category of "management", including 
those within a TNC and at independent firms in the GPN, we have a significant spectrum of 
organizational actors representing labor. Based on their involvement in the negotiation phase, 
GUFs and other representatives of labor such as home country trade unions and (European) 
works councils are predestined to want to have a say in implementation. Inasmuch as 
implementation is at the workplace, host country national and local unions as well as 
employee representative bodies, should they exist, may be involved. This range of 
“stakeholders” (Freeman 1984) is supplemented by state and supra-state agency and non-
governmental organizations. In the process of implementation, headquarters as well as 
regional management may draw on the knowledge of not only these organizations but also of 
consultants and national and/or global employers‟ organization. For this reason we think it is 
useful to adopt a multi-organizational perspective on IFA implementation.  
The outcome of IFA implementation, then, should be conceptualized as a process of 




and, in particular, the implementation phase of the agreement; an interaction taking place in a 
complex and diverse institutional environment that, at the same time, is reproduced or 
transformed by this very interaction. The result of this interaction, as much as the process 
itself, is contingent not only upon this environment but also upon the power relationships of 
the many organizations (collective actors) involved in the “contested fields” (Levy 2008; 
Amoore 2002) of labor relations in TNCs.  
Consequently, the scope of an IFA as well as its implementation will vary 
substantially, not only from one corporation to another but also within one TNC and its global 
production network. For example, in comparing TNCs, the extent to which headquarters 
management has been able to dominate the IFA negotiations based on an existing active 
policy towards corporate social responsibility will probably be reflected in the IFA‟s 
implementation, possibly even in regard to legally independent businesses in the global 
production network. On the other hand, in an institutional environment with powerful and 
active unions, the implementation of the agreement may be more reflective of a strong input 
from the “labor” side. Indeed, the complexity of the overall process, combined with its 
geographical fragmentation and the involvement of a large number of autonomous and semi-
autonomous – heterarchic” (Hedlund 1986) – organizations, will tend to lead to even more 
varying outcomes within a single TNC and its global production network.  
For all these reasons we argue in favor of a multi-organizational perspective that 
focuses on the actual implementation practices. A (social) practice is conceived here as a 
recurrent pattern behavior or action, the reproduction of which is made more likely by 
routines, rules and procedures (Giddens 1984). In the case of IFAs, practices are negotiated 
and laid down in the signed agreement. The negotiation mode is particularly important if IFAs 
are to be implemented in GPNs because for good reasons inter-organizational networks are 
sometimes considered to be negotiation systems or at least dominantly coordinated by 
negotiations (Mayntz 1994).  
Given these contingencies and the fragility of (inter-) organizational practices in 
general, the outcome of IFA implementation processes may vary widely. Due to the political 
nature of employment relations in particular, and corporate reality in general, we need to 
consider a wide range of responses (including non-responses) in regard to implementation. 
Such examples of "non-response" may occur when corporate management regards the IFA as 
only a confirmation of existing policies, i.e., in corporations that have adopted a proactive 
policy of corporate social responsibility (cf. Waddock 2008). Non-response may also occur 




management (Pfeffer 1981) is dominant. Therefore, on the one end of the spectrum we find 
the non-implementation of an IFA in the TNC because of a lack of implementation 
willingness and/or capacity, or because of severe organizational or inter-organizational 
“implementation problems”. 
At the other end we expect an implementation of the agreement in the global production 
network (i.e. including not only the TNCs and its foreign subsidiaries but also a significant 
number of their suppliers) that overcomes organizational and inter-organizational obstacles 
and constitutes some kind of promising, if not “best” practice (e.g. the practices of The Gap 
Inc., by Worley et al. 2010). All kinds of outcomes between these opposite ends of the 
spectrum are possible, including such aberrations as active avoidance or delay of the 
implementation or even the de-implementation of an IFA in parts of or in the entire GPN. A 
significant amount of diversity in management's implementation policies might be the result 
of the interplay of such factors as the degree of organizational hierarchy and the role of 
subsidiaries, information policies, available resources, and managerial prerogative may all 
affect corporate IFA policy, and ultimately, the extent of management's pursuit of 
implementation. Simply put, just as with corporate approaches to CSR, these factors can 
conceivably generate a management policy of formal implementation or embedded 
implementation, or a variety of partial implementation policies in between.  
Any multi-organizational practice perspective on IFA implementation must allow for the 
fact that parts of the agreement (e.g. prohibition of child labor) are better implemented than 
others (e.g. recognition of unions). Towards such a more differentiated understanding of the 
(inter-) organizational implementation process, the following elements of the content of an 
IFA have to be distinguished: 
(1) Recognition of all organizational representatives of “labor” and “capital”. In the 
negotiation phase, these would be in particular central management of the TNC 
and the responsible GUF(s). In the implementation phase: the responsible national 
or local union and local management. 
(2) The core labor standards set by the ILO and, possibly, additional labor standards 
concerning for instance working time, pay, workers‟ representatives, or health and 
safety issues. 
(3) A robust, bottom-up feedback process for complaints. 




(5) Extension of the agreement beyond legally dependent subsidiaries to include for 
example alliance partners, joint ventures, etc. as well as suppliers and sub-
contractors. 
(6) A process-oriented plan of implementation. 
(7) Specification of the appropriate resources needed (material, personal, 
organizational). 
Taken together, these seven elements are the core of how we define and evaluate the content 
of an IFA. A strong IFA may go well beyond the core labor standards of the ILO, suppliers, 
contain monitoring and sanction mechanisms, and lay out detailed procedures for conflict 
resolution in the TNC and its network. Weak IFAs, by contrast, may be confined to the core 
labor standards, not include suppliers, abstain from monitoring and sanctioning, and not 
contain procedures for conflict resolution.  
This bipolar understanding of the IFA‟s content – an embodiment of the negotiation 
process – has to be combined with the differentiated implementation of the agreement and its 
monitoring. Consequently, the implementation of the IFAs with different contents may also 
distinct. By using these bi-polar typologies of IFA content and implementation, we develop 
the following cases (see Figure 1).  
 Implementation 
Content “good” “bad”  
strong Case 1  Case 3 
weak Case 2  Case 4 
Figure 1: Content of IFA and type of implementation  
 
Defining and Measuring Multi-Organizational Implementation: Towards an IFA 
Implementation Scale 
Accordingly, we argue that a multi-dimensional and multi-level understanding of IFA 
implementation is needed. In light of our multi-organizational practice perspective we define 
implementation of an IFA as any practice that communicates, promotes, changes, transfers or 
at least stabilizes a certain (inter-) organizational practice that directly or indirectly improves 
or ensures minimum labor standards agreed upon in the negotiation process of an IFA; not 
only at the level of the headquarter of a TNC but also at the level of its subsidiaries and its 




For a “full scale” implementation of an IFA, we claim that at least three types of practices 
are important. The first type concerns the information dissemination and communication 
practices. The second type is marked by training practices while the third is operational, 
referring to the introduction of routines, rules and procedures as well as related organizational 
structures. Furthermore, in line with the multi-organizational practice perspective, 
implementation should be ideally conceived as a process of joint activity and decision-making 
by management and labor. 
We define information and communication practices as the tools used to inform the public 
and employees (including managers) throughout the TNC and its global production network 
of the existence of the IFA. Similarly, we describe training practices as the existence and 
types of programs used by TNCs and GUFs individually and jointly to train employees and 
unions, as well as managements in the TNC‟s subsidiaries and global production networks. 
Lastly, operational practices are described as the willingness and/or capability of 
management (and unions, works councils etc.) to actually improve working conditions and 
labor relations throughout the TNC, its foreign subsidiaries and suppliers. Based upon our 
multi-organizational perspective on these three kinds of practices we propose an IFA-
Implementation Scale (IFA-IS) that captures the recurrent activities of the IFA 
implementation process in the TNC and its global production network. To measure 
implementation with respect to these three dimensions, we concoct the instruments that reflect 
three blocks of indicators on the part of the representatives of “capital” and “labor”, either 
separately or jointly (see Tables 1,2, and 3). 
 
Methodology 
In attempt to develop such an IFA-IS to structure and "measure" the extent of 
implementation, we will use data collected by our international project team in selected TNCs 
and GUFs. To reflect the multi-organizational nature of the process, it is attempted to include 
the related actors to the extent possible. Accordingly, primary data have been collected 
through semi-structured interviews with the management at the headquarters of the TNCs as 
well as their GPNs, including subsidiaries and suppliers (where possible) in different 
countries, reflecting „capital‟ perspectives. For the „labor‟ perspective, interviews with the 
GUFs (and works councils representatives, where applicable) have been complemented with 
those at the respective national unions and labor representatives at the subsidiaries and 
suppliers. We are primarily concerned with the four leading GUFs, i.e. IMF, ICEM, BWI, and 




have chosen case study TNCs that have signed IFAs with these four GUFs. We have collected 
our primary data mainly by using semi-structured interviews with top-level people at the 
GUFs and the headquarters (mostly with top-level HRM and other managers where possible) 
of the case companies. To include the complete set of related actors, we have also collected 
primary data in four different countries, namely Turkey, India, Brazil and the USA, 
representing GPNs of these case companies. Again, we have interviewed union officers and 
shop floor representatives from the labor side, and HRM managers and other managers 
(where possible) from the capital side. 
 
Conclusion 
Are IFAs the future of global labor relations particularly for TNCs and GUFs? Do they really 
represent a mutually agreed and fair way of managing employment relations in the GPNs? In 
this paper, we will discuss our findings in attempt to develop a scale for the assessment of the 
IFA implementation in the GPNs. It is our intention to reflect the multi-organizational nature 
of this process by focusing on the actual implementation practices in four different countries 
of the GPNs of our selected case study TNCs as well as their headquarters. Implementation 
practices of IFAs across GPNs are still an under researched area and we believe that our paper 
has the potential to make a contribution to fill in some gaps in this area, particularly by using 
primary data from four different countries. 
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Transnational Corporations (TNCs)  Global union federations (GUFs)  Joint initiatives  
Informing the public  
Information and communication of agreement (intranet, 
internet, translations)  
Joint press releases & conferences  
Translation in all relevant languages  
Involving experts, media and NGOs (hearings, etc.), 
campaigning 
Roundtables and discussion groups 
Internet access  
Placards/announcements/information 
joint meetings in subsidiaries 
Intranet access   
Placards/announcements/information 
joint meetings in suppliers 
  Joint criteria development 
Defining CSR as a top management priority and part 
of business model 
 Joint reporting 
Integrating in other PR activities   
Devise joint evaluation and (re-
)evaluation process 




Establishing information and communication channels 
bottom-up (across levels and countries) 
 
Make relevant information available to public, 
transparency and access for outsiders 
  





Develop qualitative criteria for evaluation 
(communication? Action?) 
  
Social reporting about fulfillment of standards   
Elaborate a comprehensive communication strategy 
(communication? Action?) 
  
Table 1: Union and management instruments for implementation: Information and Communication 
 
Transnational Corporations (TNCs)  Global union federations (GUFs)  Joint initiatives  
Including in general management training programs Union training programs  Joint training workshops 
Special training programs for subsidiary managers 
Special training programs for subsidiary unions/employee 
reps 
 
Special training programs for sourcing managers 
Special training programs for supplier unions/employee 
reps 
 
Special training programs for HR managers   
   
Making IFA part of internal management 
communication 
(regional forums, country managers, divisions) 
  





Transnational Corporations (TNCs)  Global union federations (GUFs)  Joint initiatives  
Establishing cross-functional CSR boards Organizational capacity building Support each other's initiatives 
Establish management task force at operational level establishing company networks Joint complaint handling 
Establish formalized complaint procedure; hotlines Support local organizing initiatives 
Apply joint conflict resolution 
mechanism 
Create new management position  
Develop jointly defined implementation 
program 
Use IFA-related prescriptions and criteria as part of 
business process manuals  
 Joint task forces & fact finding missions 
Making IFA-related prescription and criteria part of 
performance criteria for business units  
 Joint pilot project for social audits 
Making IFA-related prescription and criteria part of 
management self-auditing and self-checks 
 Joint workshops with suppliers 
Including IFA-related prescription and criteria in HQ 
management audit of subsidiaries 
 Institutionalize joint efforts 
Making IFA-related prescriptions and criteria part of 
subsidiary managers‟ and factory managers‟ contracts 
and incentive schemes 
  
Support subsidiary managers to fulfill criteria   
Making IFAs part of suppliers‟ contract terms    





Internal Fact finding missions (incl. ad hoc examination)   
External (social) auditing initiatives for suppliers    
Support suppliers to fulfill criteria    
Conduct workshops with suppliers to remedy problems   
Neutrality/encouragement for local union organizing   
Pay taxes   
Look for opportunities to get community support   
Invest in community building   
Contribute to sectoral level initiatives   
Provide adequate manpower and financial resources   
Establishing information and communication channels 
bottom-up (across levels and countries) 
  
Table 3: Union and management instruments for implementation: Operational 
